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York, pursuit requires more than an objective
reason. 24 64

[Vol 10

credible

24 65
People v. Madera
(decided October 12, 1993)

The state appealed the appellate division's affirmation of the
lower court's decision to grant the defendant's motion to suppress
24 66
evidence, which defendant discarded during a police pursuit.
In affirming the appellate court's decision, the New York Court
of Appeals held that there was a lack of reasonable suspicion to
seize the evidence and thus it was properly suppressed as
2468
violative of the defendant's state 2467 and federal
constitutional rights.2469
2464. The levels of intrusion and corresponding levels of suspicion are set
forth in People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d
375 (1976). The court in De Bour formulated a four-part test to determine
whether a seizure is valid. First, the court stated that "[t]he minimal intrusion
of approaching to request information is permissible when there is some
objective credible reason for that interference not necessarily indicative of
criminality." Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384. Second,
the common law right to inquire "is activated by a founded suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot and permits a somewhat greater intrusion in that a
policeman is entitled to interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary to gain
explanatory information, but short of a forcible seizure." Id. at 223, 352
N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385. The third part, which is similar to the
Terry stop and frisk, is valid "[wihere a police officer entertains a reasonable
suspicion that a particular person has committed, is committing or is about to
commit a felony or misdemeanor .... " Id. "Finally, a police officer may
arrest and take into custody a person when he has probable cause to believe
that person has committed a crime, or offense in his presence." Id.
2465. 82 N.Y.2d at 775, 624 N.E.2d 675, 604 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1993).
2466. Madera, 82 N.Y.2d at 775, 624 N.E.2d at 675, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
2467. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This provision states in pertinent part: "The
right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated... but upon
probable cause .... " Id.
2468. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This provision states in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.., but upon
probable cause. . . ." Id.
2469. Madera, 82 N.Y.2d at 776, 624 N.E.2d at 676, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
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While on patrol, two police officers received a radio call
stating that there was a fight at a particular location, and one of
the participants had a knife. 2470 The officers were given minimal
descriptions of the two people involved. 247 1 Upon reaching the
location, their help was requested at a different location. 2472
After their return to the original destination, the police officers
saw three men, none of which resembled the descriptions given
to the police. 2473 When the officers approached the men, only the
defendant ran away. 2474 The officers then pursued him on foot,
during which time the defendant discarded a gun.2475
Subsequently, the defendant was stopped by the police and
charged with criminal possession of a gun.2476
The court of appeals, in a memorandum opinion, summarily
affirmed the appellate division decision. 2477 The court stated that
[t]he legal standard is not at issue, but only its application to
undisputed facts. Thus, the threshold question for this Court's
review is limited to whether the determination of the mixed
question of laW€ and fact - lack of reasonable suspicion of
criminality to support the police officers' belief for the pursuit
action under taken - is supported by this record. Since it is, this
Court's review is concluded and the order of the Appellate
2478
Division must be affirmed.
The appellate division held that the defendant's state
constitutional rights were violated because the police officers did
not have a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed
or was about to commit a crime. 2479 In addition, the court
2470. People v. Madera, 189 A.D.2d 462, 463, 596 N.Y.S.2d 766, 767 (Ist
Dep't), af'd, 82 N.Y.2d at 775, 624 N.E.2d 675, 604 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1993).
The radio call was based on an anonymous tip. Id.
2471. Id.
2472. Id. at 463, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 767-68.
2473. Id. at 463, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
2474. Id.
2475. Id.
2476. Id. at 463, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
2477. Madera, 82 N.Y.2d at 775, 624 N.E.2d 675, 604 N.Y.S.2d 538.
2478. Id. at 775, 624 N.E.2d at 675-76, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 538-39 (citations
omitted).
2479. Madera, 189 A.D.2d at 464-65, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 768-69.
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established that flight alone does not "constitute a sufficient basis
for a detentive stop . . . "2480 The court reasoned that
"[riegardless of whether the police action ...was justified at its
inception, it is plain that the subsequent pursuit of the defendant
was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances upon
which it was premised." 248 1 Furthermore, "[tihe police had, at
most, some basis to approach the defendant for information; they
had no reason to suspect him of criminal involvement and,
24 8 2
accordingly, no basis to pursue or detain him."
The appellate division relied on People v. De Bour.2483 The
court explained that there are four levels upon which a policecitizen encounter should be evaluated. 2484 The first department
2480. Id. at 464, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 768; see also People v. Howard, 50
N.Y.2d 583, 592, 408 N.E.2d 908, 914, 430 N.Y.S.2d 578, 585 (holding that
flight from police "is an insufficient basis for a seizure or for the limited
detention that is involved in pursuit"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980).
2481. Madera, 189 A.D.2d. at 465, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
2482. Id.
2483. 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976). In De
Bour, two police officers were suspicious of the defendant's activities and
asked him for identification whereby defendant replied he had none. Id. at 213,
352 N.E.2d at 565, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 378. The officers then noticed a "bulge"
in the defendant's jacket, and after asking the defendant to unzip his jacket,
they discovered a gun and arrested him. Id. at 213-14, 352 N.E.2d at 565, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 378. The court held the police conduct was justified and the
intrusion was reasonable. Id. at 220-21, 352 N.E.2d at 570-71, 386 N.Y.S.2d
at 383-84.
2484. Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384-85. The court
formulated a four-part test to determine whether a seizure is valid. First, the
court stated that "[t]he minimal intrusion of approaching to request information
is permissible when there is some objective credible reason for that
interference not necessarily indicative of criminality." Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d
at 571-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384. Second, the common law right to inquire "is
activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a
somewhat greater intrusion in that a policeman is entitled to interfere with a
citizen to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information, but short of a
forcible seizure." Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385. The
third part, which is similar to the Terry stop and frisk, is valid "[w]here a
police officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that a particular person has
committed, is committing or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor
... " Id. "Finally[,] a police officer may arrest and take into custody a
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explained that the broad principles of De Bour require that the
police conduct must be "justified at its inception" and that the
action be "'reasonably related' in scope to the circumstances"
which rendered its initiation permissible. 2 485 The court further
stated that the reasoning of De Bour shows that police action
must be justified from the beginning and during any other
subsequent action, even if it does not amount to a seizure as
defined by the Fourth Amendment. 24 86 The court explained that
this is to ensure that all police-citizen encounters are subjected to
judicial scrutiny. 2487
It is evident from New York case law that the De Bour decision
continues to provide the basis for evaluating police-citizen
encounters, and the parameters of what may be admitted as
evidence. This line of reasoning was demonstrated in the trial
court's decision of the case at hand, People v. Madera.2488 The
lower court in Madera specifically rejected the application of the
recent United States Supreme Court decision of California v.
Hodari D.,2489 regarding the definition of a seizure. 24 90 The
lower court explained there was a contrast between the New
York case law and the Hodari D. analysis regarding seizures and
the admissibility of evidence. 249 1 The court stated that New York
law has not followed the Hodari D. decision because it restricts
constitutional liberties. 24 92 Instead, the New York court system
has applied the protection of the State Constitution. 2493
Specifically, Supreme Court case law has demonstrated the
differene between the Supreme Court's definition of a seizure
and the state law definition on which the court in Madera relied.
person when he has probable cause to believe that person has committed a
crime, or offense in his presence." Id.
2485. Madera, 189 A.D.2d at 465, 596 N.Y.S. at 769 (quoting De Bour, 40
N.Y.2d at 215, 352 N.E.2d at 566, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 379).
2486. Id. at 465, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
2487. Id.
2488. 153 Misc. 2d 366, 580 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1992).
2489. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
2490. Madera, 153 Misc. 2d at 370, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
2491. Id.
2492. Id.
2493. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
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The Supreme Court, in Hodari D., limited the definition of a
seizure by stating it can only occur when a person submits to a
show of authority or when a governmental agent applies physical
force. 2 4 9 4 Since the defendant did not submit to the show of
authority, the Court reasoned that the defendant was not seized
until he was tackled. 2495 The Court held the seizure was lawful,
2496
and the evidence procured during the pursuit was admissible.
This recent decision has severely limited the definition of a
seizure which was previously applied by the Supreme Court.
Prior to the decision in Hodari D., a reasonable person test was
used by the Court to assess police-citizen encounters. 2497
In conclusion, federal decisional law regarding the onset of a
seizure is dramatically different than that of New York law.
Specifically, the De Bour decision, which is followed by the
court in Madera provides greater protection to the defendant in
police-citizen encounters than does the decision in Hodari D.
Thus, the De Bour four-tier analysis provides judicial scrutiny to
all police-citizen encounters, while federal law only applies
judicial scrutiny if the police officer exerts physical force, or the
defendant submits to a show of authority.

2494. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626. The defendant and other youths fled when
they observed police officers approaching in an unmarked car. Id. at 622-23.
The officers chased the defendant, during which he discarded crack-cocaine.
Id. at 623. Subsequently, the officers apprehended and handcuffed the
defendant. Id.
2495. Id. at 629.
2496. Id.
2497. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (holding
that a reasonable person would objectively believe his movement was restricted
due to a show of authority by a police officer); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 554 (1983) (holding that a seizure occurred because a show of authority
would allow an individual to reasonably believe his movement was restrained);
I.N.S. v. Delgado, 446 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (holding the administering of
factory surveys by I.N.S. agents to employees of a factory did not constitute a
seizure); Michigan v. Chestnut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988) (holding a police
official's conduct of driving a car parallel to defendant did not constitute a
seizure because a reasonable person would not feel his liberty was restrained).
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